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Abstract—Security-critical products rely on the secrecy and
integrity of their cryptographic keys. This is challenging for low-
cost resource-constrained embedded devices, with an attacker
having physical access to the integrated circuit (IC). Physically
unclonable functions (PUFs) are an emerging technology in this
market. They extract bits from unavoidable IC manufacturing
variations, remarkably analogous to unique human fingerprints.
However, post-processing by helper data algorithms is indispens-
able to meet the stringent key requirements: reproducibility,
high-entropy and control. The novelty of our work is threefold.
We are the first to provide an in-depth and comprehensive
literature overview on HDAs. Second, our analysis does expose
new threats regarding helper data leakage and manipulation.
Third, we identify several hiatuses in current research.
Index Terms—physically unclonable function, helper data al-
gorithm, key generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Maintaining the secrecy and integrity of cryptographic keys
at a low manufacturing cost is challenging. Especially for
resource-constrained embedded devices, with an attacker hav-
ing physical access to the integrated circuit (IC). Traditionally,
keys are stored in non-volatile memory (NVM), encapsulated
in the IC. Mature technologies are the following: EEPROM
and its successor Flash, battery-backed SRAM and fuses.
However, EEPROM/Flash requires floating-gate transistors,
increasing the manufacturing cost with respect to a regular
CMOS process. Batteries are costly as well. Furthermore,
NVM technologies tend to be vulnerable to physical attacks
due to their permanent robust electrical nature. Finally, ad-
ditional circuitry to protect against physical attacks is rather
expensive. Consider e.g. protective coatings or sensors to
detect invasion.
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are a promising
alternative for secure low-cost key generation. Essentially, they
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are binary functions of which the behavior depends on IC
manufacturing variations. Therefore, they are rather analogous
to unique human biometrics. Most PUFs are compatible with
a regular CMOS process, benefiting manufacturing cost. Fur-
thermore, the secret is hidden in the physical structure of an IC,
which is a much less readable format. Also, invasive attacks
might damage the PUF and destroy the secret. Unfortunately,
output bits cannot be used directly as a key. Post-processing by
helper data algorithms (HDAs) is required to meet the stringent
key requirements: reproducibility, high-entropy and control.
Contribution. The novelty of our work is threefold:
• We are the first to provide an in-depth overview on HDAs,
comprehending a decade of research. Various schemes for
entropy compression, error-correction, bit selection and
manipulation detection are reviewed. This significantly
supersedes the glance in [44]. PUFs are regarded as a
black-box, making our manuscript generic.
• Our analysis reveals new threats regarding helper data
leakage and manipulation, most importantly the follow-
ing. We derive an exact formula for the leakage of
repetition codes in case of bias, demonstrating the well-
known (n − k) upper bound to be overly pessimistic.
We demonstrate that the leakage of soft-decision coding
has been underestimated. We describe divide-and-conquer
manipulation attacks for parallel codes, concatenated
codes and soft-decision codes. We disprove the intuitive
assumption that bit selection schemes have no leakage.
• We identify hiatuses in current research, offering a foun-
dation for future work.
Overview. The remainder of this manuscript is organized
as follows. Section II provides preliminaries. Section III
describes an accurate PUF reliability model, serving as a
reference. Section IV provides a high-level framework for PUF
HDAs. Entropy compression, error correction, bit selection and
manipulation detection are discussed in Sections V, VI, VII
and VIII respectively. Section IX identifies open problems in
current research. Section X concludes the work.
2II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Vectors are denoted with a bold lowercase character, e.g. c.
All vectors are row vectors. Matrices are denoted with a bold
uppercase character, e.g. H. Functions are printed in italic,
e.g. Hamming weight HW(e). Random variables are denoted
with an uppercase character, e.g. X .
B. Probability Distributions
Random variables are described by their probability density
function (PDF) or cumulative distribution function (CDF), de-
noted by f and F respectively. Equation 1 considers a normal
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ = 1.
Equation 2 considers a binomial distribution with k successes
for n Bernoulli trials, each having success probability p.
FN (x′) =
x′∫
−∞
fN (x) dx =
x′∫
−∞
exp
(
−x22
)
√
2pi
dx. (1)
FB (k′;n, p) =
k′∑
k=0
fB (k;n, p) =
k′∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1−p)n−k. (2)
C. Entropy
Consider a secret binary variable X , which is either a bit
or a bit vector. We define its entropy using logarithms to the
base 2, as it is the most natural choice. Equation 3 represents
the Shannon entropy and quantifies the average-case resistance
against a brute-force attack. However, we will focus on the
more conventional notion of min-entropy, as given by Equation
4, corresponding to the worst-case resistance.
H(X ) = −EX [log2(P (X ))]. (3)
H∞(X ) = − log2
(
max
X
(P (X ))
)
. (4)
Assume now that an attacker obtains additional information
about X , as described by the variable Y . We therefore define
the conditional entropy of X given Y . An attacker has typically
no control over Y , so we use the average-case resistance here.
Equations 5 and 6 correspond with the Shannon and min-
entropy respectively. We will focus again on the latter.
H˜(X|Y) = −EY [EX [log2(P (X|Y))]]. (5)
H˜∞(X|Y) = − log2
(
EY
[
max
X
P (X|Y)
])
. (6)
D. Physically Unclonable Functions: Black-Box Description
The binary input and output of a PUF are referred to
as challenge c and response r respectively. The challenge-
response behavior is different for each IC due to manufac-
turing variations. Unfortunately, there are discrepancies with
a random oracle. First, the response bits are not perfectly
reproducible. Transistor-level noise sources are the main re-
sponsible. Environmental fluctuations, e.g. IC supply voltage
and outside temperature, make things worse. Second, the
response bits are non-uniformly distributed. The entropy is
non-maximum due to bias and correlations. Bias means that
0 and 1 do not occur with equal probability.
One often distinguishes between two categories of PUFs,
depending on their scalability. Weak PUFs have an array struc-
ture, with each cell producing one or more bits1. Addressing
the array provides a challenge-response mechanism. The total
bit-content scales linearly with the circuit area. Correlations
are primarily of spatial nature. Strong PUFs have a small
response space but a large challenge space, e.g. 1 bit and 128
bits respectively. The total bit-content is enormous and scales
exponentially with the circuit area. However, correlations are
much more severe: they originate from the functional behavior
which is composed from a limited number of circuit elements
only.
III. PUF RELIABILITY MODEL
There is considerable advantage in having a generic but
accurate PUF reliability model. First, a model provides more
insights than raw experimental data. Second, one can compre-
hend the full spectrum of PUFs rather than a single instance
only, by modifying model parameters. Third, it facilitates the
design and analysis of HDAs. We describe a well-validated
reliability model, serving as a reference later-on, although our
results do not fully depend on its assumptions. A probability
distribution describes the error rate of individual response
bits r˜. But first we provide a warning regarding the use of
‘averaged’ simplified models.
A. Naive, homogeneous
The most simple reliability model assigns an identical error
rate to each response bit, as used in e.g. [4], [41]. This naive
homogeneous approach does not correspond with PUF reality.
Nevertheless, one might be able to obtain accurate formu-
las for the average-case device failure rate within a certain
working range. We consider this a dangerous practice though,
especially for small-dimensioned constructions, operating on
a limited number of bits. Furthermore, the model does not
acknowledge that the device failure rate will show a spread
among ICs: yield issues arise in industry where customers
expect products to have a fixed quality level. Slightly better
is a split between stable and unstable bits, although one does
not always mention there to be a continuous transition rather
than a strict separation.
1This structure is not limited to memory-based PUFs, such as the SRAM
PUF. Also coating PUFs [39] map to an array. And also the ring oscillator PUF
[37], considering the most usable read-out modes such as neighbor chaining.
3B. Accurate, heterogeneous
A heterogeneous approach draws the error rate Pe for each
response bit r˜ from a certain probability distribution. We
describe a comprehensible reliability model, first employed
in [36] and later validated with experimental PUF data in
[10], [24]. Error rate Pe is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) among response bits. Two hidden
variables are incorporated, representing manufacturing vari-
ability and noise respectively. Their contributions are assumed
to be additive and independent. Furthermore, both variables are
assumed to be normally distributed, as empowered by the cen-
tral limit theorem: each represents a complicated accumulation
of local circuit effects.
Variability component v has mean zero and a certain stan-
dard deviation σV among response bits, as shown in Figure
1(a). Also noise component n˜ has mean zero and a certain
standard deviation σN , among an infinite set of evaluations. A
threshold value T implements an analog-to-digital conversion.
Equation 7 represents both the nominal and instantaneous
value of a certain response bit. A non-zero mean of either
v or n˜ could be incorporated in T . The bit error rate is given
in Equation 8 and graphically represented by Figure 1(b). The
closer to the threshold, the more often a bit does flip.
0
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Fig. 1. Heterogeneous PUF reliability model. The noise PDF is centered
around the variability component vi for a certain challenge ci. The black
shaded area corresponds with Pe.
r =
{
1, if v > T
0, otherwise
, r˜ =
{
1, if v + n˜ > T
0, otherwise
. (7)
Pe = P (r˜ 6= r) = FN
(−|v − T |
σN
)
. (8)
C. Entropy
Two variables uniquely quantify the reliability characteris-
tics of a PUF: T/σV and σN /σV . An attacker is typically
assumed to know their values. This is a not unreasonable,
given the many potential clues: dimensioning of the HDA,
measurement of system failure rates, helper data, etc. A non-
zero threshold value T does introduce bias, as defined by
Equation 9. Equation 10 represents the min-entropy. However,
there is some ambiguity: one could define an instantaneous
bias as well, as in Equation 11. Although discrepancies might
not be significant, care is advised when comparing various
work: former and latter bias represent a best-case and worst-
case respectively2.
B = P (r = 1) = 1− FN
(
T
σV
)
. (9)
H∞(r|B) = − log2(max(B, 1−B)). (10)
B˜ = P (r˜ = 1) =
1
σV
∫ ∞
−∞
fN
(
v
σV
)
FN
(
v − T
σN
)
dv.
(11)
D. Model Limitations
Each model has its limitations. We summarize effects which
are not taken into account. However, even for the basic hetero-
geneous model, HDA analysis is still lacking, as demonstrated
later-on.
Environmental perturbations are not taken into account. One
should distinguish between DC and AC variations. The latter
is a form of noise injection and could be incorporated by
increasing σN . DC variations are more complicated, as they
modify the nominal response behavior of the PUF. The error
rate is typically defined with respect to the response at a certain
DC reference environment. Increasing σN might capture this
effect well, as implicitly assumed in [11] and experimentally
validated for various PUFs using temperature and supply
voltage variations. Alternatively, [23] introduces an additional
hidden variable, again additive and normally distributed, with
experimental validation for various PUFs using temperature
variations.
Spatial and functional correlations are not included. How-
ever, correlation among v would imply correlation among
Pe(v) as well. Furthermore, for weak PUFs with a high bit-
content, and hence spanning a large IC area, a single set of
model parameters might be insufficient.
Temporal correlations are not included either. Response bit
samples r˜ are not necessarily independent, if the measurement
interval is short. This effect originates from low-frequency
noise. Or also, low-frequency perturbations of the environ-
ment.
PUF behavior might evolve over time due to transistor-aging
effects (NBTI, PBTI, HCI, etc.) [26]. The reference response
is typically defined at manufacturing time. Therefore, the error
rate is expected to increase gradually.
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR PUF-BASED KEY GENERATION
Figure 2 represents a framework for PUF-based key gener-
ation. We consider a low-cost resource-constrained embedded
device, prone to both physical and protocol attacks, as depicted
in Figure 2(a). Key storage in NVM comprehends two phases,
as shown in Figure 2(b). The first phase is a one-time enroll-
ment in a secure environment after device manufacturing. A
2Assuming v and n to be fully independent over their whole range.
4unique key k is then defined and programmed in the device.
The second phase is in-the-field deployment, where an attacker
might be waiting.
Embedded
device
i o
Attacker
Physical
Protocol
(a)
NVM Application
k
k
i o
×
(b)
PUF HDA Rep Application
Helper dataHDA Gen
p
rIN
×
r˜IN k
p i o
p
p?
(c)
Fig. 2. Framework for PUF-based key generation. Enrollment steps are drawn
dashed. Physical attack pathways are drawn zigzag. One-time interfaces,
destructed after enrollment, are marked by the symbol ×.
PUF technology might alleviate the two drawbacks of
NVM: vulnerability to physical attacks and a high manufac-
turing cost. We assume the PUF to generate a lengthy string
of response bits rIN . For weak PUFs, this corresponds with
an array read-out. For strong PUFs, this would require the
evaluation of a list of challenges, provided by a pseudorandom
number generator starting from a fixed seed for instance. The
same two phases are present again. Helper data p = Gen(rIN)
is generated during enrollment. Gen can be implemented
off-chip to save resources. In-the-field, the IC performs a
reconstruction k = Rep(r˜IN ,p). Helper data can be stored
in insecure (off-chip) NVM, or by another party.
We avoid the regularly used term syndrome to indicate
helper data. This would be confusing since one popular
HDA component actually employs the syndrome of an error-
correcting code, as clarified later-on. We also stress that fuzzy
extractors [12], [13] comprehend only a subset of all HDAs.
Their definition offers two guarantees. First, correctness of re-
construction, given HD(rIN , r˜IN) ≤ t, with t a fixed parameter.
Second, output k is nearly uniform, assuming an attacker to
observe helper data p.
A. Key Requirements
We define five key requirements. They are straightforward
to satisfy for the traditional NVM scenario. For PUFs, this is
very different, implicating the need for a HDA. Most work on
HDAs considers the first two requirements only.
KeyReq1: reproducibility. This is always required. It is
common practice to define a maximum failure rate for the
key reconstruction phase, e.g. PFAIL ≤ 10−6. This is coupled
to a certain manufacturing yield: PUF noisiness and hence also
PFAIL shows a spread among devices.
KeyReq2: uniformly distributed. Keys are assumed to have
maximum entropy. For some applications, entropy loss can
be forgiven, given the use of a longer key. E.g. for the
computation of a HMAC, the application penalty might be
low.
KeyReq3a: PUF independency. One might have to program
a key which does not depend on the PUF. This does not
necessarily imply full control over the key bits: the HDA
might perform additional hashing for instance. Consider e.g.
symmetric key communication between two PUF devices with
the same HDA. Or e.g. the replacement of a malfunctioning
device with preservation of the key.
KeyReq3b: mathematical restrictions. The key might have
to satisfy certain mathematical properties. Consider e.g. the
primality test of RSA.
KeyReq3c: full control. One might need the ability to
program any given key in the device. Consider e.g. symmetric
key communication with a legacy device. This requirement
supersedes KeyReq3a and KeyReq3b.
A trivial solution for KeyReq3 is to encrypt/decrypt appli-
cation keys with a PUF-derived key [33], [40]. The encrypted
application keys are stored in insecure (off-chip) NVM, or
by another party. For KeyReq3b in particular, one could
also use the PUF-derived key as a seed for a deterministic
keygen routine [38]. However, this might consume a lot of
resources. Various HDA components offer intrinsic support
for KeyReq3a, as clarified later-on.
B. Enrolled Reference: Bit Error Rate
Equation 8 describes the error rate of r˜, considering the
nominal value r as a reference. This is the best-case scenario,
as the latter is the most likely value of the former. Therefore,
it is very beneficial to perform a majority vote for the enrolled
response rIN , in order to approximate the nominal value. This
significantly relieves the burden, i.e. implementation overhead,
of Rep. Voting has no impact on the IC footprint, as it can
happen off-chip. Although the enrollment will take more time,
it is a one-time effort only. Equation 12 considers an enrolled
bit rIN for an odd number of votes q. Equation 13 represents
the error rate for r˜IN : the more votes, the better. Most formulas
in this manuscript only depend on the averaged error rate, as
given by Equation 14.
rIN =
{
1, if r˜(1) + r˜(2) + . . .+ r˜(q) > q−12
0, otherwise.
(12)
P INe = P
(
r˜IN 6= rIN) = {Pe, if r = rIN
1− Pe, otherwise
with P
(
r = rIN
)
= FB
(
q − 1
2
; q, Pe
)
.
(13)
EV
[
P INe
]
=
1
σV
∫ ∞
−∞
fN
(
v
σV
)
P INe (v) dv. (14)
C. Public Helper Data: Attack Scenarios
We stick to the widely accepted notion that helper data
should be public. Imposing constraints implicates the need
for secure on-chip NVM, as in Figure 2(b), undermining the
5potential benefits of PUF technology. An attacker can perform
both read and write operations: the threats are identified as
leakage and manipulation respectively. The latter supersedes
the former: if blindly writing a 0 does not result in a failure,
then the previous value of the bit must have been a 0 too.
Helper data p unavoidably leaks information about the
response rIN . This entropy loss can be compensated at the
cost of more PUF bits, as clarified later. So it is mainly a
matter of accurately quantifying the leakage in order to fully
mitigate this threat. One typically assumes a single exposure
of the helper data. It is not unthinkable however that there is
more leakage when repeatedly exposing helper data for noisy
variants of rIN [5], assuming an on-chip implementation of
Gen. Especially in combination with fault injection attacks
on r˜IN . Preventing this would require some sort of one-time
interface to disable Gen.
Helper data manipulation comprehends two categories of
threats. First, it can facilitate physical attacks on either the
HDA or the application, as exploited in [28]. Second, protocol
attacks can be mounted via the I/O interface of the application,
as exploited in [8], [9], [17]. By observing o, one aims to
test hypotheses regarding the key k for a certain malicious
string p?. Below, we distinguish two types of applications, in
terms of vulnerability. Section VIII will provide an overview
of generic countermeasures, not depending on the HDA.
AppWeak: Output o depends exclusively on the key k and
known data, given a series of commands via i. Consider e.g.
an IC which returns a ← Encrypt(k,n) for a user-defined
nonce n. This would allow for IC authentication, by matching
a. An attacker can then distinguish between keys: o1 6= o2
if k1 6= k2. This is relevant, as helper data might allow to
(partly) reprogram the key.
AppStrong: Output o is persistently indifferent if any other
key than k is being processed. Consider e.g. a secure boot
application, decrypting processor code. A failure is bound to
occur if k is not reconstructed correctly. However, observing
failure rates might still be very informative for certain manip-
ulations.
D. Assembling a Helper Data Algorithm
A practical HDA is an assembly of components rather
than a single building block. One can typically distinguish
three consecutive steps3, as represented in Figure 3. First, bit
selection, discarding the least reliable bits. This alleviates the
burden of the second step: error-correction. An interaction of
former steps results in a reasonable failure rate PFAIL, but the
outgoing bits have non-maximum entropy. A third step per-
forms entropy compression. We discuss the steps in backwards
order, describing and analyzing individual proposals.
V. ENTROPY COMPRESSION
The entropy of rIN is non-maximum because of two reasons.
First, correlations and bias of the PUF. Second, leakage of the
HDA. Entropy compression ensures the key k to be nearly
3In various works, PUF-specific helper data is employed, especially for the
ring oscillator PUF and its variants [8]. These constructions are considered to
be out-of-scope here.
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Fig. 3. Consecutive steps of a HDA. Typical profiles for failure rate PFAIL,
the number of bits and their total entropy.
uniform. This step is also referred to as privacy amplification,
although the latter term might be more applicable to its
original biometric context [22]. The total amount of entropy
is preserved, but the average per bit increases by having
more input than output bits. A hash function is the well-
established solution, as first proposed in [15]. One computes
k = Hash(rIN).
One mostly opts for a lightweight hash function. A popular
choice is SPONGENT, implemented in [17], [18], [27]. A
more bulky hash could be fine as well, especially if the
application requires its implementation anyway. E.g. SHA-
1 has been implemented in [38]4. According to the fuzzy
extractor definition [12], [13], one should opt for a univer-
sal hash function. Helper data then indicates the randomly
selected function instance. The universal Toeplitz hash, which
conveniently maps to an LFSR-based architecture, has been
implemented in [4], [25], [28]. There is no stringent need for
this however, although it would allow for a simple but secure
update of the key k.
VI. ERROR-CORRECTION SCHEMES
Error-correction, also referred to as information reconcilia-
tion, ensures the key to be reproducible. We discuss various
constructions.
A. Temporal Majority Voting
Majority voting, previously discussed for the enrollment,
can be performed during reconstruction as well [2]. However,
then it is not a one-time effort anymore and additional IC-
hardware (counters) is required. Equation 15 represents the
error propagation for an odd number of votes q. Low bit error
rates are successfully suppressed, but high rates remain high,
as shown in Figure 4. Therefore the method is never suffi-
cient by itself: further error-correction or prior bit-selection is
advised.
4More recent cryptanalytic results are mainly for collisions, so SHA-1 could
still be used for entropy compression.
6POUTe = 1− FB
(
q − 1
2
; q, P INe
)
with q odd. (15)
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Fig. 4. Temporal majority voting.
B. Exhaustive Search
The IC could perform an exhaustive search for the error
pattern [30]. However, this might consume too much resources
to be practical. The overhead also includes a secure check for
correctness, as a stopping criterion.
C. Secure Sketch: Code-offset and Syndrome Construction
Secure sketches, as defined in [12], [13], are the workhorse
of most HDAs. They allow for the construction of a
fuzzy extractor. Despite the rather generic definition, two
constructions dominate the implementation landscape,
as specified below. Both the code-offset and syndrome
construction employ a binary [n, k, t] block code C, with t
the error-correcting capability5. A variant of the code-offset
construction allows to fulfill KeyReq3a [41]. Instead of
outputting the error-corrected response, one could also feed
w into the entropy compression hash. Or alternatively m,
the message corresponding to the codeword, as it would
require less compression. The syndrome construction requires
a linear block code, as it employs the parity check matrix H.
Successful reconstruction is guaranteed for both constructions,
given HW(e) ≤ t.
Gen Rep
co
de
-o
ff
se
t
Random w ∈ C w˜← r˜IN ⊕ p = w ⊕ e
p← rOUT ⊕w Error-correct w˜ to w
rOUT ← p⊕w
sy
nd
ro
m
e p← rOUT ·HT s← r˜IN ·HT ⊕ p = e ·HT
Determine e
rOUT ← r˜IN ⊕ e
The code-offset construction is employed in e.g. [4],
[24], [25], [41]. The syndrome construction is employed
in e.g. [27], [38], [42]. BCH codes in particular are very
popular: they are implemented in [27], [38], [42], [45], [46].
Also repetition codes are rather popular, due to their ease of
implementation [4], [25]. The latter is fundamentally different
from temporal majority voting, although there is some
similarity for the number of errors they can correct. Other
codes have been implemented as well, such as Reed-Muller
[4], [25], [41] and Golay [4], [41].
5The first use of error-correcting codes in a PUF context was in [14], [15].
1) Failure: Equation 16 represents the averaged failure rate
of both secure sketch constructions. The formula holds under
the i.i.d. assumption, as in the heterogeneous reliability model
of Section III. A proof is provided in appendix A. An identical
formula, when omitting both expected value operators, could
be derived easily from the naive homogeneous reliability
model [4]. However, as such one does not acknowledge PFAIL
to show a spread among ICs.
EV [PFAIL] = 1− FB
(
t;n,EV
[
P INe
])
. (16)
2) Leakage: Leakage of the code-offset construction (and
its variant) can be understood as a one-time pad imperfection.
The secret rOUT is XORed with a vector which is not fully
random: codeword w has entropy k < n. For the syndrome
construction, helper data can be understood as direct leakage:
each helper bit reveals a linear equation of response bits. As
proven in [12], [13], the min-entropy loss is at most (n− k)
bits for both secure sketch constructions6:
H˜∞((rOUT |BOUT)|p) ≥ H∞(rOUT |BOUT)− (n− k). (17)
Especially for repetition codes REP[n,1,n−12 ], with n odd,
there is an imminent threat: at most 1 bit of min-entropy can
remain. The devastating power of bias has been illustrated in
e.g. [43]. More recently, this warning has been repeated in
[21], although we consider their conclusions as exaggerated.
One seems to ignore that (n− k) is an upper bound only. We
are the first to derive an exact formula for the min-entropy
loss of REP, in the case of bias. Equation 18 is valid for both
secure sketch constructions, as proven in Appendix B. Figure
5 illustrates that Equation 17 is overly pessimistic.
H˜∞((rOUT |BOUT)|p) =
− log2
(
FB
(
n− 1
2
;n,min
(
BOUT , 1−BOUT))) . (18)
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Fig. 5. Min-entropy loss for repetition code REP[11,1,5], REP[3,1,1] and
the degenerate case REP[1,1,0]. Solid curves correspond with Equation 18.
Dashed curves correspond with equation 17. Due to the symmetry around
B = 1
2
, only half of the spectrum is shown.
6The leakage upper bound is more generally applicable than bias only.
73) Manipulation: No generic manipulation attacks have
been published so far, but we make a few observations
for the code-offset construction. First, omitting the entropy
compression hash would enable related-key attacks (AppWeak
only). For the original method, one can inject a malicious
helper string p? ← p⊕e, with HW(e) small. This would result
in a related key k? ← k ⊕ e. For the variant, assuming the
conventional usage of linear codes, one can add a codeword:
p? ← p⊕w, resulting in a related key k? ← k⊕w.
Second, one can derive estimates of individual bit error rates
P INe . This requires the AppWeak and AppStrong assumption for
the original and variant respectively. The potential threats are
described later in Section VI-F, as this exposure is an integral
part of soft-decision coding. We introduce a synthetic error
for one particular bit: p? ← p ⊕ e, with HW(e) = 1. By
measuring failure rate PFAIL before and after, one can derive
an estimate. A lot of measurements will be required though
to obtain a reasonable accuracy.
D. Codes in Parallel
Very often, it is not feasible to process all response bits
with a single code, due to the decoding complexity [4], [25],
[27]. This is resolved by subdividing r in x non-overlapping
sections of length n, processed independently by a smaller
code. To save area and power, sections are decoded one-by-
one.
1) Failure: Equation 19 is a trivial extension of Equation
16. Introducing sections is not without a penalty. More PUF
bits will be required to obtain the same failure rate and key
length, taking leakage into account. An illustration is provided
in Figure 6.
EV [PFAIL] = 1−
(
FB
(
t;n,EV
[
P INe
]))x
. (19)
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Fig. 6. Failure rate versus code rate for BCH codes, with EV [P INe ] = 5%.
Increasing x worsens the trade-off.
2) Leakage: Former leakage results can be applied to each
parallel instance separately.
3) Manipulation: A novel divide-and-conquer manipulation
attack aims at retrieving the section responses one-by-one. The
brute-force effort is drastically reduced: roughly x2k instead of
2xk, when omitting entropy compression. Linear codes, which
are consistently used in literature, are found to be secure.
Less conventional codes, which have not been employed in
literature so far, not necessarily. We provide some examples for
the code-offset construction, under the AppStrong assumption.
Consider a nonlinear code having at least three codewords.
Algorithm 1 can retrieve the section responses. It does not
matter whether 0 ∈ C. Set I is expected to contain a single
element in the end. Depending on the code, false positives
might occur in the occasional case that the sum of three
codewords is again a codeword. This can easily be resolved
with an extension of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1: ATTACK FOR NONLINEAR CODE-OFFSET
Input: List of codewords w1,w2, . . . ,wk′
Helper data p
Output: Response section r
I ← {1, 2, . . . , k′}
for i← 1 to k′ do
j ← mod (i, k′) + 1
Modify helper data: p? ← p⊕wi ⊕wj
if key reconstruction failed then
I ← I\{i, j}
r← p⊕wI
Codes with some sort of non-uniformity for t would be
in danger as well. Consider e.g. the following scenarios. First,
1→ 0 and 0→ 1 errors might not be equivalent [47]. Second,
t might differ per codeword. Third, the error-correcting capa-
bility for each codeword might be correlated with the position
of the errors. In all former cases, an attacker can iterate again
over all potential codewords and test hypotheses via PFAIL.
E. Concatenated Codes
Concatenated codes, in the context of PUFs, have first been
proposed in [4]. They have also been adopted in e.g. [27].
They are particularly useful when EV [P INe ] is high. Consider
the concatenation of two block codes: [n2, k2, t2]◦ [n1, k1, t1],
with n1 an integer multiple of k2. A good design is as follows.
Code C2 should be able to correct many errors (a high ratio
t2/n2). Repetition codes in particular are very popular. Code
C1 only needs to correct a few errors (a low ratio t1/n1), but
therefore a high k1 to maintain entropy.
1) Failure: PFAIL depends on the decoder characteristics
of C2. We distinguish between repetition codes and all other
codes, as represented by Equation 20 and 21 respectively. As
before, they are the more accurate equivalent of a similar
formula in [4]. We assume the general case of x concatenated
codes in parallel. For repetition codes, the decoding behavior
is trivial: if the number of errors exceeds t2, a single error
will propagate always. For other codes, we assume that half
of the outgoing bits is expected to flip if t2 is exceeded.
EV [PFAIL] = 1−
(
FB
(
t1;n1, 1− FB
(
t2;n2, EV
[
P INe
])))x
.
(20)
EV [PFAIL] = 1−
(
FB
(
t1;n1,
1− FB
(
t2;n2, EV
[
P INe
])
2
))x
.
(21)
82) Leakage: Leakage formulas can again be applied inde-
pendently. The outgoing entropy of each parallel instance can
never exceed k1.
3) Manipulation: Divide-and-conquer manipulation attacks
are again a threat. There is inherently a parallel structure for
C2. And typically x > 1, endangering C1 too.
F. Soft-decision
Soft-decision decoding, in the context of PUFs, has been
introduced conceptually in [24], with a subsequent implemen-
tation in [25]. The error-correcting capabilities improve with
respect to traditional hard-decision decoding. Less PUF bits
are required for the same failure rate and key length, taking
leakage into account. The original proposal comprehends a
collaboration with the code-offset method, hereby exposing
all bit error rates P INe as public helper data
7.
Unfortunately, the decoding effort increases significantly.
Soft-Decision Maximum-Likelihood (SDML) decoding offers
the best performance, by iterating over all codewords and
computing the likelihood each time. The computational com-
plexity is hence exponential with the code dimension k. There
are faster procedures for some codes at the cost of reduced
performance. Consider Generalized Multiple Concatenated
(GMC) codes: one exploits e.g. that a large Reed-Muller code
can be split recursively in two smaller Reed-Muller codes.
1) Leakage: Exposing a vector PINe of bit error rates is
stated not to result in additional min-entropy loss [24]. A
proof of Equation 22 has been derived for the heterogeneous
reliability model of Section III-B. Before arguing that the
leakage threat has been underestimated, we confirm that the
proof by itself is correct and provide some additional insights.
H˜∞((rOUT |BOUT)|PINe ) = H∞(rOUT |BOUT). (22)
Exposure of Pe allows for a twofold ‘inversion’ of the curve
in Figure 1(b). This arms an attacker with an individual bias
BOUTi for each bit, as represented by equation 23, in contrast to
an averaged bias BOUT . We observe that EV [BOUTi ] = B
OUT , a
fact which is implicitly embedded in the proof in [24]. We also
observe that Equation does 22 not extend to Shannon-entropy:
the average-case brute-force attack is accelerated.
BOUTi =
fN
(
T+|vi−T |
σV
)
fN
(
T−|vi−T |
σV
)
+ fN
(
T+|vi−T |
σV
)
=
1
1 + exp
(
2T |vi−T |
(σV)2
) . (23)
Unfortunately, one does not incorporate the interaction with
the code-offset method. Exposure of PINe might increase the
leakage of p, although the former does not leak by itself, as
represented by Equation 24. We demonstrate this for repetition
codes in particular in Figure 7.
7A variation has been proposed in [41]. Several PUF bits are clustered and
averaged to form soft-decision data. Measurement of Pe and its accompanying
exposure as helper data is not required, at the cost of performance loss.
H˜∞((rOUT |BOUT)|(p,PINe )) ≤ H˜∞((rOUT |BOUT)|p). (24)
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Fig. 7. Soft-decision leakage for a [3, 1, 1] repetition code. Solid lines
represent Equations 18 and 38. Dots represent independent simulation results
to verify the correctness of the latter.
Finally, exposure of PINe can facilitate modeling attacks,
assuming the use of a strong PUF. Reliability data has been
demonstrated to be a modeling asset for easy targets such as
the arbiter PUF [10], [11].
2) Manipulation: We are the first to warn against divide-
and-conquer manipulation attacks, although their relevance
would depend on implementation details. Due to the decoding
complexity, there is strong tendency for x > 1, even more
than for its hard-decision counterpart. We limit ourselves
to a conceptual illustration in Figure 8. We assume SDML
decoding with k > 1 and the AppStrong scenario. For ease of
understanding, assume that the response bits to be perfectly
reproducible, although extension to a more realistic setting is
not that hard. By setting P INe ← 12 , bit r does not contribute
to the likelihood computation anymore. By observing failures
for a few PINe patterns, one might be able to discard all-
but-one codewords. Note that also repetition codes (k = 1)
might be vulnerable, by setting Pe ←
(
1
2
1
2 . . .
1
2
)
: some
implementations might then select the first (or last/second)
codeword always.
G. Convolutional Codes
The popularity of block codes does not exclude other possi-
bilities. The use of convolutional codes has been proposed in
[17], [18]. They implement a hard-decision Viterbi algorithm.
H. Substring Matching
An alternative for error-correcting codes has been proposed
in [31], [32]. We limit ourselves to the basic idea only.
Consider a lengthy string of PUF bits r. During enrollment, a
shorter substring rSUB is selected at random, possibly consider-
ing r to be circular, and exposed as public helper data. Former
selection procedure is repeated for several strings: substring
indices are combined to obtain a key k of sufficient length.
During reconstruction, substrings are shifted along newly
generated strings r˜. The correct indices are retrieved via their
low Hamming distance. The scheme is able to fulfill KeyReq3a
and possibly also KeyReq3b and KeyReq3c if substring indices
are simply concatenated to form the key.
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Fig. 8. Soft-decision manipulation attack, illustrated for a [7,4,1] code.
We assume SDML decoding, deterministically iterating over all codewords
w, top-to-bottom as indicated by the arrow. We also assume that the first
codeword is selected in case of a likelihood tie.
1) Failure: Failure behavior has been studied in [9], so
we limit ourselves to qualitative insights. First, the longer the
substrings (while upscaling r as well to maintain its number
of indices), the lower PFAIL: the gap in Hamming distance
between correct and incorrect indices relatively increases.
Unfortunately, this is accompanied with a direct efficiency
overhead. Second, the shorter r (while maintaining the length
of rSUB), the lower PFAIL: there is less competition between
indices then. However, more substrings are required to obtain
a key of equal length.
2) Leakage: The leakage concept is slightly different that
for error-correcting codes. Before, we examined the direct
entropy loss of a secret response r. The challenge list 〈c〉
is known: PUF correlations would amplify the helper data
leakage, although this effect has not been quantified in this
and previous work. Now, one should examine to which extent
an attacker can retrieve the link between a known list 〈c〉
and a non-secret substring of the response rSUB. For a perfect
non-correlated PUF, the leakage would be zero, unlike before.
However, correlations are by no means hidden and hence easy-
to-exploit: there is imminent danger for the most vulnerable
strong PUFs.
3) Manipulation: Helper data manipulation attacks have
been applied successfully in [9], working under either the
AppStrong or AppWeak assumption. They gradually append
bits to the substrings rSUB, in terms of exposure. The danger
is twofold. First, exploitation of PUF correlations is facilitated.
Second, if r is non-circular, substring indices can be retrieved
directly, independent of the PUF.
VII. BIT SELECTION SCHEMES
Bit selection is the crude (or lightweight) version of soft-
decision coding: the least reliable bits are simply discarded.
This lowers the burden of the subsequent error-correction step.
There is a good symbiosis with temporal majority voting: only
low bit error rates sustain selection, which can be dealt with
effectively [2]. For high loss ratios, it might even be possible to
omit the error-correction step [3]. The overhead of bit selection
greatly differs for weak and strong PUFs. The former case is
more problematic: there is a direct cell/area loss. For strong
PUFs, the challenge generator only needs to make a few skips.
We are the first to disprove the intuitive assumption that
bit selection does not leak. We demonstrate there to be an
amplification of bias. Furthermore, we derive formulas de-
scribing the drop in EV [Pe], given the heterogeneous reliability
model of Section III. Previously derived formulas for the error-
correction step are compatible. We now discuss the proposals
one-by-one and compare them afterwards.
A. Global Thresholding
Imposing a global threshold for P INe is the most intuitive
idea. This has first been proposed in [36], with employment
later-on in [2], [3], [17], [19], [37].
1) Failure: We discard all bits with |v−T | ≤ δv. Equation
25 represents the ratio of discarded bits. Equation 26 is the
averaged bit error rate, hereby embedding Equation 13.
Loss =
1
σV
∫ T+δv
T−δv
fN
(
v
σV
)
dv. (25)
EV
[
POUTe
]
=
1
σV(1− Loss)
(∫ T−δv
−∞
fN
(
v
σV
)
P INe (v) dv +
∫ ∞
T+δv
fN
(
v
σV
)
P INe (v) dv
)
.
(26)
2) Leakage: Equation 27 represent the bias of the outgoing
bits. We later illustrate graphically that there is an entropy loss:
|BOUT − 12 | > |B − 12 |.
BOUT =
1− FN
(
T+δv
σV
)
1− FN
(
T+δv
σV
)
+ FN
(
T−δv
σV
) . (27)
3) Manipulation: The scheme is highly vulnerable to helper
data manipulation, even under the AppStrong assumption.
Assume each selected bit to have discarded neighbors to its
left and right. By shifting a selected index and observing
the failure rate P FAIL, one can check whether bits are equal.
Repeated exploitation of this principle can reveal all response
bits, except for one degree of freedom. The former has been
described in [17], although one does not recognize there to be a
problem if Loss is small: clusters of selected bits counteract the
attack. However, in combination with other HDA components,
or under the AppWeak assumption, it might be resolvable.
4) Format: The helper data format comprehends a trade-
off between its size and its on-chip interpretation effort. We
argue that one should make a choice based on Loss. In [3],
one assigns a dedicated helper bit to each response bit. This is
efficient if Loss ≈ 50%. In [17], a list of helper data indices
represents the relative distances between consecutive selected
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bits, which if efficient if Loss is high. If Loss is low, one can
represent distances between consecutive discarded bits instead.
However, representing distances with a fixed number of bits
is not necessarily efficient. As a resolution, the same authors
later proposed a run-length encoding scheme in [18].
B. Local Thresholding: 1-out-of-n
A local equivalent of global thresholding has been proposed
in [37]. Response rIN is subdivided in non-overlapping sec-
tions of length n. For each section, only the most reliable bit
is retained. Equation 28 represents the ratio of discarded bits.
A potential decrease in helper data size would be the main
advantage with respect to global thresholding.
Loss =
n− 1
n
. (28)
1) Failure: The failure behavior can be analyzed via or-
der statistics [1]. We reorder section bits according to their
variability component: v(1) < v(2) < . . . < v(n). Equation 29
represents the joint PDF of v(1) and v(n), assuming the non-
degenerate case n > 1. Equation 30 represents the averaged
bit error rate, hereby embedding Equation 13.
f(v(1), v(n)) =
n(n− 1)
(σV)2
fN
(
v(1)
σV
)
fN
(
v(n)
σV
)
(
FN
(
v(n)
σV
)
− FN
(
v(1)
σV
))n−2
with v(1) < v(n).
(29)
EV
[
POUTe
]
=∫ ∞
−∞
∫ T−|v(n)−T |
−∞
f(v(1), v(n))P
IN
e (v(1)) dv(1)dv(n)
+
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
T+|v(1)−T |
f(v(1), v(n))P
IN
e (v(n)) dv(n)dv(1).
(30)
2) Leakage: Equation 31 represent the bias of the outgoing
bits. We will again demonstrate graphically that there is a bias
amplification and hence entropy loss.
BOUT =
∫ ∞
T
∫ v(n)
2T−v(n)
f(v(1), v(n)) dv(1)dv(n) (31)
3) Manipulation: As for global thresholding, bit equalities
can be extracted, although limited within a section. In case of
bias (B 6= 12 ), there is an additional entropy loss.
4) Extension: A generalization of the scheme has been
proposed in [37] as well. One selects k out of n bits, with
k ∈ [1, n]. With n equal to the length of rIN , there would be an
equivalency with global thresholding. Also, the manipulation
threat increases for the non-degenerate case k > 1.
C. Local Thresholding: Index-Based Syndrome
A variation on 1-out-of-n selection has been proposed
in [43], with employment in [46] later-on. The index-based
syndrome (IBS) scheme is able to satisfy KeyReq3a. The
most reliable 0 or 1 within each segment is selected, with
equal probability. Or more accurately: the selected bit either
minimizes or maximizes (v − T ), as the target value is not
necessarily available. Equation 28 still represents the ratio of
discarded bits.
1) Failure: Equation 32 represents the averaged bit error
rate, again embedding Equation 13 hereby.
EV
[
POUTe
]
=
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
f
(
v(1)
)
P INe (v(1)) dv(1)
+
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
f
(
v(n)
)
P INe (v(n)) dv(n) with
f
(
v(n)
)
=
n
σV
fN
(
v(n)
σV
)(
FN
(
v(n)
σV
))n−1
and
f
(
v(1)
)
=
n
σV
fN
(
v(1)
σV
)(
1− FN
(
v(1)
σV
))n−1
.
(32)
2) Leakage: As proven in [43], there is no leakage under
the i.i.d. assumption. Stated otherwise: BOUT = 1/2.
3) Manipulation: A similar manipulation threat as for 1-
out-of-n selection is present.
4) Extension: An integration with local error-correction has
been proposed in [16], referred to as C-IBS. The trade-off
between EV [POUTe ] and Loss is improved somewhat, at the cost
of increased implementation complexity. One selects a random
codeword within each segment: either
(
0 1 . . . 0
)
or(
1 0 . . . 1
)
8, both having an odd number k of alternating
bits. Each codeword is decoded to a single bit: Equation 28
still represents the ratio of discarded bits. Up to (k − 1)/2
bit errors can be corrected, without introducing helper data.
Again, there is no leakage: BOUT = 1/2.
D. Comparison
Global thresholding offers the best-trade-off between
EV [POUTe ] and Loss, as shown in Figure 9. The 1-out-of-
n selection scheme is significantly worse, although the k-
out-of-n extension can lessen the gap. IBS has the lowest
performance, although C-IBS can offer some improvement.
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Fig. 9. Bit selection: trade-off between EV [Pe] and Loss. The ingoing bits
obey σN /σV = 0.2 and T = 0. We assume the enrollment majority vote
to be ideal (q =∞). All formulas are represented with solid lines, although
only global thresholding is of continuous nature. Dots represent independent
simulation results, to confirm the correctness of the formulas. For C-IBS, we
only have simulation results (codewords of length 3).
For leakage, the order of preference is reversed. IBS and
C-IBS do not amplify bias, as shown in Figure 10. Rather the
opposite: they remove all bias. For the two other schemes: the
8Choosing other codewords would lower the performance.
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larger Loss, the more bias amplification. Global thresholding
amplifies bias the most.
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(C-)IBS
1-out-of-n
global
(0.9)
1-out-of-n
global
(0.5)
B
H
∞
(r˜
O
U
T
)
Fig. 10. Bit selection: leakage. The ingoing bits obey σN /σV = 0.2.
Between brackets, Loss is indicated. Dots represent independent simulation
results, to confirm the correctness of the formulas.
VIII. DETECT MANIPULATION AND NON-MALICIOUS
FAILURES
The IC can employ a scheme to detect helper data ma-
nipulation and abort its operation prematurely. Four schemes
are represented in Figure 11. Minor variations can be applied
to all, but our main purpose here is to provide an overview
of the design flavors and associated issues. All require a
cryptographic function, but resources can be shared with the
application or the entropy compression step. There is a thin
border with schemes for detecting non-malicious failures, due
to PUF noisiness. One can then either warn the application
that the key is invalid or launch a retrial.
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r˜ k
HDA
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Fig. 11. Helper data manipulation detection.
The scheme in Figure 11(a) stores Hash(k,p) as public
helper data [6]. It offers full protection against attacks via
the application interface: any modification to p will be de-
tected with extremely high probability. Instead of the key k,
one can also use the error-corrected response r as a secret
hash input. The latter protects the entropy compression hash
against manipulation-enhanced physical attacks. The former
does not offer any protection. Both offer full failure detection:
a modification in k is almost certainly detected.
Figure 11(b) represent a simplification of the former
scheme: only a hash of the key is stored [20], [31]. Unfor-
tunately, there is no protection against application interface
attacks which rely on the AppStrong assumption. Note that sev-
eral HDAs have already been attacked under this assumption,
as summarized in this manuscript. These attacks only require
the measurement of failure probabilities for the original key (it
does not matter whether the observable failure is generated by
either the application or the detection scheme). Furthermore,
no protection against manipulation-enhanced physical attacks
is offered. There is full failure detection though.
Figure 11(c): One can also use a digital signature [39].
Although public key cryptography is perhaps not so very
lightweight. One assumes tamper-proof storage of the public
key (no manipulation), partly opposing the advantage of PUF
technology. One can employ one-time programmable NVM
as well as hard-wired read-only NVM, but the latter would
imply the same key pair for many ICs: there are large-scale
consequences then in case of compromise. During enrollment,
one signs p with the private key. There is full protection
against manipulation-enhanced physical attacks. In the original
proposal, there is a second signature for the key k too. This
would provide full failure detection.
Figure 11(d): In [17], one employs a scheme where the
key depends on the helper data. There are no strong security
guarantees under the AppWeak assumption. E.g. related-key
attacks on the application. A minimum of helper data seems
to be the main benefit. We note that the XOR could have been
omitted by hashing p together with HDA output: this would
consume less resources and perhaps offer better security (no
related-key attacks). There is no detection of failures.
IX. OPEN PROBLEMS
We identify various topics with little coverage in open
research so far. They are suggested as further work.
A. Global Optimization
HDA design comprehends method exploration as well as
configuring parameters. Experience and insights of the de-
signer seem to determine global decision making. We argue
that computer-aided optimization might lead to better results.
This implicates the automated evaluation of leakage, failure
rates, bit loss, implementation complexity, etc. for a given
design instantiation. Analytic formulas as well as simulations
can be employed.
B. Secure Testing
For industrial applications, secure post-manufacturing test-
ing of a HDA is a must. The traditional trade-off between
testability and security still applies. However, the ability to
correct errors is a major complication for obtaining a high
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fault coverage. A built-in self-test for a conventional fuzzy
extractor has been designed in [7]. HDA components perform
part of the testing functionality, to minimize overhead.
C. Physical Attacks
HDAs are not necessarily secure against physical attacks.
Side-channel analysis has been applied successfully to a code-
offset secure sketch and Toeplitz hash function in [28]. A
masking countermeasure for the code-offset secure sketch,
taking benefit of code linearity, has been presented in [29]. One
mixes a random codeword into the HDA input, by performing
p ⊕ wRAND, with compensation later-on. The generation of
wRAND requires a secure true random number generator in
addition to message encoding. Extension to Toeplitz hashing
is possible due to internal linearity.
D. Reverse Concept
For certain applications, an IC might communicate with
a resource-rich server, using symmetric key cryptography. A
reverse fuzzy extractor [42] reduces the workload of the IC
by shifting Rep to the server and implementing Gen on the
IC instead, as the latter consumes less resources. Although
originally proposed as part of an authentication protocol, it
directly applies to key generation. The IC could generate a
non-deterministic key k˜ ← Hash(r˜) and send helper data to
the server for reconstruction. However, repeated helper data
exposure might increase the leakage threat. Therefore one
recommends the syndrome secure sketch, as the n−k leakage
upper bound is provably still valid [5]. Extension to other HDA
methods is to be studied.
E. Correlations
As in prior work, correlations are not taken into account
properly. Quantifying correlations is hard and PUF-dependent.
There is work in the construction of integrated PUF models,
capturing bit error rates, correlations and possibly other ef-
fects. Furthermore, leakage of HDA components should be
reevaluated: correlations are expected to increase the min-
entropy loss. Finally, data-dependencies are not taken into
account when correcting errors: there is margin to improve
performance [35].
F. Leakage Reduction
Although leakage can be compensated, one might still aim
to reduce it. We question the practical value of two rather
unusual approaches.
In [45], the leakage of two HDAs is evaluated: the code-
offset construction and IBS. Their calculation assumes an
attacker to have knowledge of r. Therefore, discarded IBS
bits are regarded as leakage too, although helper data does
not reveal their value. We argue that leakage gets irrelevant
if cause and effect are reversed. A supposedly more secure
version of IBS is proposed: candidate bits are discarded with
a fixed probability (e.g. 50%) before applying the standard
procedure based on reliability and nominal value. Under the
conventional attacker model as described in Section IV, this
would be an efficiency burden only, not improving security.
In [34], one spams the attacker with fake helper data
instances as a form of obfuscation. These instances have the
same probability distribution as the genuine one and are all
sorted according to a random permutation. The IC is able to
distinguish fake and genuine via reconstruction trial-and-error.
Manipulation detection is crucial: otherwise an attacker can do
the same, by modifying an instance and observing PFAIL. The
method might be relevant if the total entropy of the PUF is
hardly sufficient to generate a secret key: the loss of valuable
entropy is reduced. However, a typical PUF is not bothered by
this limitation. The scheme is actually very costly compared to
an increase in the number of PUF bits. The workload for the
resource-constrained IC and the resource-rich attacker scales
roughly the same in terms of the number of fake instances.
X. CONCLUSION
We provided a first in-depth overview on HDAs for PUF-
based key generation, comprehending a decade of research.
Furthermore, our analysis revealed various new threats re-
garding helper data leakage and manipulation. Finally, we
identified hiatuses in current research, offering a foundation
for future work.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF FAILURE RATE USING SECURE SKETCH
We derive a proof for Equation 16, holding under the i.i.d.
reliability assumption. All incoming bits will then obey a
certain PDF f(P INe ). We make use of the Poisson-binomial dis-
tribution, as defined by Equation 33. This generalizes the bino-
mial distribution, with the success probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pn
of each trial not necessarily equal.
FP (k′; 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉) =
k′∑
k=0
fP (k; 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉)
=
k′∑
k=0
1
k!
dk
n∏
i=1
(1− pi(1− t))
dtk
|t=0.
(33)
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EV [PFAIL] = 1−
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
. . .
∫ 1
0
(
n∏
i=1
f(Pei)
)
FP (t; 〈Pe1, . . . , Pen〉) dPe1dPe2 . . . dPen = 1−
FP
(
t; 〈
∫ 1
0
f(Pe1)dPe1, . . . ,
∫ 1
0
f(Pen)dPen〉
)
= 1− FP (t; 〈E[Pe], . . . ,E[Pe]〉)
= 1− FB (t;n,E[Pe])
(34)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF REP LEAKAGE USING SECURE SKETCH
We derive a proof for Equation 18. First, we apply definition
6 and simplify using Bayes’s theorem:
H˜∞((rOUT |BOUT)|p)
= − log2
(
Ep
[
max
rOUT
P
(
(rOUT |BOUT)|p)])
= − log2
(∑
p
max
rOUT
P
(
rOUT |BOUT)P (p|rOUT))
(35)
For the code-offset construction, we assume the enrollment
to be ideal: P(w|rOUT) = 1/2. We assume the following
codewords:
(
0 0 . . . 0
)
and
(
1 1 . . . 1
)
. The leakage
does not depend on this, but it makes the derivation more
comprehensible. We elaborate Equation 35 as shown below,
introducing the variable ∆ = HW(p).
= − log2
(
n∑
∆=0
(
n
∆
)
1
2
max
((
BOUT
)∆
(1−BOUT)n−∆,
(
1−BOUT)∆(BOUT)n−∆))
= − log2
(
FB
(
n− 1
2
;n,min(BOUT , 1−BOUT)
))
(36)
For the syndrome construction, the enrollment is fully
deterministic: max P(p|rOUT) = 1. We assume the following
helper data: p =
(
r1 ⊕ r2 r1 ⊕ r3 . . . r1 ⊕ rn
)
. Again,
the leakage does not depends on this, but it makes the
derivation more comprehensible. We elaborate Equation 35
as shown below, again introducing the variable ∆, and obtain
an equality with Equation 36.
= − log2
(
n−1∑
∆=0
(
n− 1
∆
)
max
((
BOUT
)∆
(1−BOUT)n−∆,
(
1−BOUT)∆(BOUT)n−∆))
(37)
APPENDIX C
REP LEAKAGE USING SOFT-DECISION CODING
Equation 38 represents the min-entropy of outgoing soft-
decision bits when including joint leakage of p and Pe.
Unfortunately, the expression does not simplify well.
H˜∞((rOUT |BOUT)|(p,Pe))
= − log2
(
Ep,Pe
[
max
rOUT
P
(
(rOUT |BOUT)|(p,Pe)
)])
= − log2
(
1
(σV)n
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)∫ ∞
T
fN
(
v1
σV
)
. . .∫ ∞
T
fN
(
vi
σV
)∫ T
−∞
fN
(
vi+1
σV
)
. . .
∫ T
−∞
fN
(
vn
σV
)
max(BOUT1 . . . B
OUT
i (1−BOUTi+1 ) . . . (1−BOUTn ),
(1−BOUT1 ) . . . (1−BOUTi )BOUTi+1 . . . BOUTn )/
(BOUT1 . . . B
OUT
i (1−BOUTi+1 ) . . . (1−BOUTn )+
(1−BOUT1 ) . . . (1−BOUTi )BOUTi+1 . . . BOUTn )
dvndvn−1 . . . dv2dv1
)
(38)
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